On 02 Jan 2024 at 07:27p, NuSkooler pondered and said...
tenser around Wednesday, January 3rd...
Oh, I don't know: incremental progress towards security as a goal may slow, but is still progress, no?
I'd argue that it's just a false sense of security, which can be worse than none.
Perhaps. It wouldn't protect against any number of other
attack vectors, but neither would a new protocol. On the
other hand, if binkp regularly ran over TLS-protected
connections, it would be (largely) immune to passive sniffing.
Not that that matters much; I doubt the greater BBS community
is passing any traffic that _requires_ it.
If we were to implement a *new* protocol that is always encrypted, that would be a better start -- only policy can prevent people from exposing the messages elsewhere though + old setups will inherently be left out.
A way around that would be a proxy at the edge of that system's
local network that handles encryption. It's not completely
end-to-end, but does it need to be?
--- Mystic BBS v1.12 A48 (Linux/64)
* Origin: Agency BBS | Dunedin, New Zealand | agency.bbs.nz (21:1/101)